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Zoning, Development Timing, and
Agricultural Land Use at the Suburban
Fringe: A Competing Risks Approach
Diane Hite, Brent Sohngen, and Josh Templeton
Competing risks survival analysis is used to investigate tax and zoning policy impacts on residential,
commercial, and industrial development timing in a rapidly growing Midwestern county. Industrial
development appears both to precede and occur concurrently with residential development, while
commercial development follows other types. Although residences appear to locate away from indus-
trial land, zoning decisions favoring industry may attract rather than deter residential development
within a jurisdiction. Regions with higher infrastructure taxes experience development later. Because
school taxes fund local public goods important to homeowners, they have little influence on residen-
tial timing, but strong influences on industrial and commercial timing.
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As economic growth in the 1990s boomed, large
areas of agricultural and other undeveloped land
converted rapidly to developed uses. While develop-
ment outside a central city can benefit the local and
regional economy (Gordon and Richardson, 2000),
many authors argue there are negative impacts of
rapid suburbanization, including inefficient use of
land or other resources, reduced environmental qual-
ity, and congestion, among other impacts (see, for
example, Hamilton and Röell, 1982; Kahn, 2000;
Brueckner, 2000; Plantinga and Miller, 2001).
Concern with externalities has led policy makers
to question whether existing policies inadvertently
cause land to change more quickly, and whether
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alternative policies could slow land use change at
the suburban fringe. Given the many policies avail-
able—land taxes, zoning restrictions, impact and
development fees, direct land use controls, and
growth boundaries—it is useful to examine how
existing policies have affected land use change, and
whether stricter policies could alter the timing of
converting agricultural land to developed uses.
Within the literature, many theoretical studies
have explored how tax policies are likely to affect
the timing of land use change (e.g., Bentick, 1979;
Anderson, 1986, 1993; Turnbull, 1988a,b; Capozza
and Li, 1994; McFarlane, 1999). Fewer studies have
explored the influence of zoning on timing of land
use change, although Irwin and Bockstael (2002)
show land use change in one parcel can influence
the timing of changes in nearby parcels. Thus, zon-
ing policies designed to limit specific types of uses
in one location can influence the timing of change
on neighboring parcels.
Alternatively, Fujita, Thisse, and Zenou (1997)
and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) argue that
industrial and commercial developments outside of
cities can spur positive feedbacks, potentially by
raising relative real wages, and attracting further resi-
dential development. Not only can taxes influence
development timing, but the type of development
occurring in an area can influence the land around it.
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In this study, we first present a theoretical analy-
sis to assess how property tax millage rate and
zoning policies potentially influence timing of land
conversions from agricultural to residential use. An
empirical analysis is then conducted using competing
risks survival analysis to explore the potential effects
of a range of factors on the timing of commercial,
industrial, and residential developments. The empir-
ical model examines the way certain explanatory
variables influence the time to conversion for
agricultural land parcels over 10 years within a fast-
growing Midwestern county. The model is used to
examine changes in development timing of residen-
tial, commercial, or industrial land under alternative
assumptions about tax millage rates and zoning in
homogeneous tax districts.
Only a few studies to date have used parcel-level
data to analyze development timing (e.g., Irwin and
Bockstael, 2002; Irwin, Bell, and Geoghegan, 2003),
although some studies have used aggregate metro-
politan-area data to explore the effects of land use
regulations on residential development (e.g., Mayer
and Somerville, 2000). No studies to our know-
ledge employ competing risks to assess how the
three different land use types interact.
Our study does not specifically examine patterns
in land use change, as in Irwin and Bockstael
(2002), but by using parcel-level data, we are able
to control for spatial factors that influence land
values at different locations in the region. Our inter-
est, instead, is to determine how policies like taxes
or zoning influence the timing of land use change in
contiguous regions where taxes and zoning policies
are applied uniformly. While it is difficult to identify
the specific influence of one type of development
on another (e.g., Irwin and Bockstael, 2002), our
results do provide information about how the
development process occurred in the region under
investigation, and potentially how zoning and taxes
may influence future development.
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model focuses on the timing of resi-
dential land use conversions because this emphasis
encompasses most of the change that occurred in
our study region. The model only examines the
timing decision, without considering the decision
addressing how intensively to develop a particular
parcel (as in McFarlane, 1999). Development deci-
sions are assumed to be made within homogeneous
tax districts, where the tax structure for all the de-
veloped properties is the same—i.e., all developed
properties are taxed at the same marginal rate per
$1,000 of value.
Because agricultural properties in the study region
typically have tax advantages bestowed upon them
by special agricultural land use valuation programs,
the model allows for different valuations among
agricultural and developed land uses. The per acre
rental rate for developed residential land at time
u is given as R(u; q(τ, I), X), where q(τ, I) is the
quality of public services provided (i.e., schools,
infrastructure). The quality of public services (i.e.,
school quality, fire protection, environmental qual-
ity) is assumed to be a function of the tax millage
rate, τ, and the intensity of industrial development
near the parcel, I. X is a vector of additional loca-
tional factors affecting land rents for any parcel of
land. The focus of this study is on how tax millage
rate policies and zoning decisions over the intensity
of industrial (or commercial) development in taxing
districts affect timing of land use decisions. It is
assumed Rq $ 0, and Rqq # 0; however, the under-
lying relationships between taxes and industrial
infrastructure are more complicated.
First, we assume qτ $ 0, and qττ # 0. Higher tax
rates on existing properties should increase public
services provided to residents in a given region,
although tax increases likely have their largest
effects for regions with relatively low initial tax
rates.
1 Second, the relationship between public
services and industrial development density could
be positive or negative, qI $ or # 0. We assume
qII # 0, regardless of the first-order effect. For low
levels of industrial development density, an in-
crease in development can improve public services
by increasing overall tax revenues for the taxing
district. Industrial developments can often benefit
residential uses because they have high infra-
structure value per acre of land developed. How-
ever, if industrial development is too dense, it could
cause pollution or congestion, or otherwise reduce
local environmental amenities.





$ or # 0.
That is, the relationship between rental rates and
industrial development density is ambiguous. Both
of these impacts are tied to the presence of indus-
trial development. The landowner’s objective is to
1  We suspect, in most cases, higher taxes will result in greater levels of
public services. However, as noted in the empirical section below, differ-
ent types of taxes can map differently into public service quality and the
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maximize the value of land at time 0 by choosing
the date of development, T. The value function for
an agricultural landowner is given as:










R u; q(τ, I), X e&(r%τ)(u&T)du & c ,
where A(u) is the annual rental value of agricultural
land at time u, VF(u) is the value of agricultural land,
and c is the cost of developing a parcel of land for
residential use. The developer chooses T to maxi-
mize land value. As a result of the assumption of
exogenous capital intensity, rental rates are assumed
to be exogenous to the landowner’s decision, and
policy makers are assumed to choose tax rates so
that all revenues collected are spent locally on public
goods. Further, zoning decisions are made such that
tax revenues equal public goods expenditures.
The first-order condition for optimal develop-
ment timing is given as VT = 0. Specifically,









RT u; q(τ, I), X e&(r%τ)(u&T)du
' R T; q(τ, I), X % τVF(T).
The left-hand side of equation (2) is the marginal ben-
efit of waiting a moment to develop a parcel of land.
This is the sum of the benefits of an additional period
of agricultural rent, the opportunity cost of capital for
developing, the avoided taxes on the developed land,
and the benefit that waiting a period to develop could
have on rental rates (i.e., if rental rates are growing
over time, then postponing development could bring
a higher stream of rents in the future).
The right-hand side of (2) is the lost opportunity
of waiting to develop, including foregone rent on
developed property and the taxes paid on agricul-
tural land. Anything raising rental rates increases the
marginal opportunity costs of waiting to develop, and
should increase the rate of development. However,
raising rental rates increases future tax burdens,
which also raises the marginal benefits of waiting to
develop.
2 Thus, the effects of raising tax rates or
changing industrial density are likely to be un-
certain, as they depend on the relative strengths of





R u; q(τ, I), X e&(r%τ)(u&T)du.
Here, we explore more closely the influence of the
industrial density variable on development timing.
Results on taxes are uncertain, as in other studies
(Anderson, 1986; McFarlane, 1999). To measure
the effect of a change in industrial density on devel-
opment timing, we assess the sign of (!VTI/VTT).
Note, because VTT is negative at the optimal devel-
opment time, we need to sign VTI:








RTI u; q(τ, I), X e&(r%τ)(u&T)du & RI.
If VTI is positive, additional industrial land will slow
development, while if it is negative, additional in-
dustrial land will speed development. As noted
above, increasing industrial land density could have
positive or negative effects on land rental rates.
Assuming small amounts of industrial land provide
improved public services so that RI $ 0, an increase
in industrial development would speed up develop-
ment if:








RTI u; q(τ, I), X e&(r%τ)(u&T)du.
Thus, if the increase in rental rates in a region out-
weighs the additional taxes raised on residences due
to higher land valuations, more industrial land will
speed up development. In contrast, if the density of
industrial development is high initially, or if prop-
erties are located too close to industrial land, and
RI # 0, then additional industrial land could slow
development.
The Data
To explore the potential effects of changing tax rates
and zoning policies on land conversion timing, we
use parcel-level data on land conversions in Dela-
ware County, Ohio, over the period 1988S1998.
Delaware County is one of the fastest growing
counties in Ohio and the United States. Although
the county remains predominately agricultural in
terms of land use, the population grew rapidly dur-
ing the study period. The study region is adjacent to
2  For undeveloped land, we assume developed rental rates grow smooth-
ly from a level lower than agricultural rental rates initially. Industrial devel-
opment, however, can have both positive and negative effects on residen-
tial development values. We therefore assume residential development
occurs at the first point at which the condition in equation (2) is met, and
development is irreversible.148   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review











Industrial 93          2,434.87 1,044.91 841          9.04
Commercial 209          2,690.67 1,303.96 1,324          6.33
Residential 8,843          2,759.67     979.42  18,006          2.03
No Change 5,843          — — 167,876         28.76 
and north of the metropolitan area of Columbus,
Ohio, and the Columbus outerbelt skirts the southern
boundary of the county. For the most part, the county
is relatively flat, but has a number of interesting
human and natural geological and environmental
features which likely affect development patterns.
The City of Delaware is the largest population
center in the county, centrally situated and approx-
imately 12 miles from the county’s southern bound-
ary. There are four large water supply reservoirs in
the county that service residents in the entire central
Ohio region, and a large state park surrounds the
northernmost reservoir. In addition, two major inter-
states and two major rivers run north-to-south
through the county.
The data for this analysis consist of 14,988 par-
cels strictly classified as being in agricultural use in
June 1988, as recorded by the Delaware County
Auditor. Additional information on any parcels that
transacted between June 1998 and July 1998 was
also obtained from the auditor’s data and was used
to track changes in land use classification. For our
survival analysis, a variable was included to measure
the number of days from the beginning of 1988 until
either the time of the transaction in which the land
use changed or the end of the observation period.
A difficulty with using survival analysis for land
development is that each data point starts out with
large plots of agricultural land under one owner,
subsequently dividing into many smaller lots under
different owners. One strategy for addressing this
problem is to define the unit of observation pros-
pectively so that when a large plot changes into
many smaller ones, it is considered to be the loss
of one lot. However, anecdotal evidence suggests
farmers may sell part of an agricultural plot for
residential or other nonagricultural use, while
retaining some portion of the land in agriculture.
Consequently, a retrospective treatment of the data
may be applicable. Specifically, each plot that
moves to nonagricultural use is counted as an indi-
vidual loss, resulting in a larger number of conver-
sions than would be obtained using the prospective
method. The retrospective method is used in this
analysis.
From the data, 167,876 acres of land were in
agricultural use in 1988—predominantly row crops
such as corn and soybeans. Of these, 20,171 acres
had been converted to other uses by 1998. Signifi-
cantly more land converted to residential than to
other uses (table 1), and the average sizes of lots
converting to industrial and commercial uses were
over three times the size of lots converting to resi-
dential use. In terms of mean conversion time,
average industrial conversion precedes residential
conversion in the county by nearly a year (324.8
days), and precedes commercial conversion by
about 8.5 months on average. Without taking into
account spatial factors, this pattern of change shows
industrial development precedes both commercial
and residential development in Delaware County.
Distances of each parcel to a range of environ-
mental, neighborhood, and infrastructure character-
istics were measured using Geographic Information
Systems (GIS). Given the wide range of factors
likely to influence development patterns, we include
a large number of control variables in the analysis,
namely: proximity to infrastructure (roads, high-
ways, exit ramps, sewer lines, transmission lines,
etc.), proximity to the central city and fringe job
centers, and land quality (slope). Table 2 presents
the variables used in the analysis, and reports their
corresponding means and standard errors.
To assess the impacts of property tax rates and
zoning policies on land use change timing, we
focus on regions within the county having the same
marginal tax rates and public services for each
resident. There are two primary types of property
taxes: those funding local infrastructure (police,
fire, streets, etc.), and those funding schools. In the
study region, school districts cross over township
and municipal boundaries, resulting in 49 districts
with separate tax rates for schools or infrastructure.
Tax rates for each of these districts are determined
for the 1984S1998 period, allowing us to assess
lagged tax impacts. The number of parcels in eachHite, Sohngen, and Templeton Zoning, Development Timing, and Land Use at the Suburban Fringe   149
Table 2. Variables Used in the Analysis




SouthBnd$M Log miles distance to Delaware County southern boundary 1.139 0.904
Delaware$M Log miles distance to Delaware City center 2.090 0.616
Road$M Log miles distance to nearest road !3.005 1.101
Highway$M Log miles distance to nearest major highway 0.815 0.974
TransLine$M Log miles distance to nearest transmission line !0.254 1.253
Water$M Log miles distance to nearest water body !1.883 1.305
Stream$M Log miles distance to nearest stream !0.808 1.042
School$M Log miles distance to nearest school 0.471 0.884
Comm$M Log miles distance to nearest commercial plot !1.104 1.165
Industry$M Log miles distance to nearest industrial plot !0.002 1.005
Sewer$M Log miles distance to nearest sewer line 0.257 1.825
RingMuni Within one mile radius of city limits 0.303 0.460
SchoolQ School quality as measured by test scores 75.318 6.273
Slope Slope length of property 3.501 4.713
SchoolTax
 a All school taxes within a tax district, lagged one year 38.506 9.661
InfraTax
 a All taxes within a tax district except school, lagged one year 16.665 4.030
SchoolTax×Slope
 a Lagged school taxes interacted with slope 134.918 198.158
AgLeftK
 a Acres of agricultural land left per year, lagged one year 88.498 83.498
CapInt
 a Per district total structure size divided by lot size, lagged one year 0.072 0.091
%CnvRes
 a Per district annual % agricultural land converted to residential,
    lagged one year
0.892 0.218
%CnvCom
 a Per district annual % agricultural land converted to commercial,
    lagged one year
0.072 0.170
%CnvInd
 a Per district annual % agricultural land converted to industrial, 
    lagged one year
0.031 0.130
%Ind88 Percentage of industrial land per district in 1988 0.027 0.041
%Com88 Percentage of commercial land per district in 1988 0.045 0.044
%Res88 Percentage of residential land per district in 1988 0.175 0.134
a Denotes time-varying variable.
b Mean values are based on N = 14,988 parcels in the Delaware County, Ohio, study area.
tax district ranges from 10 to 7,997, comprised of
25 to 18,900 acres each. Annual millage rates range
from 0.82 to 64.16 for schools, and 10.40 to 79.88
for infrastructure.
Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to intro-
duce every zoning decision into our model, we
assume that the land use proportions which emerge
in each taxing district reflect zoning decisions. For
example, the decision to allow more land to be zoned
industrial in a given region will result in larger pro-
portions of industrial uses in that region. To control
for zoning decisions made before 1988, we calculate
the percentage of land per tax district in agricul-
tural, residential, commercial, and industrial uses in
effect in 1988 (%Ag88, %Res88, %Com88, and
%Ind88, respectively). To control for decisions
made throughout the analysis period, annual agri-
cultural land converted to residential, commercial,
and industrial acres is calculated as a percentage of
available land in a district (%CnvRes, %CnvCom,
and %CnvInd, respectively), lagged by one year.
Note that zoning decisions are made by munici-
palities or the county. Because of the way we model
the tax districts, each tax district has a single entity
in charge of zoning, so that zoning decisions are
consistent within the tax district. Zoning decisions,
of course, can also be similar across different tax
districts if they fall under the same zoning authority.
Zoning laws can also affect the density of devel-
opment. As above, density regulations are only
observed after land use decisions have been made.
That is, we do not observe whether zoning boards150   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
have required developers to increase or decrease
their building density relative to their initial pro-
posals. However, we do observe different densities
across the county, which likely reflect zoning
decisions. These densities may also reflect eco-
nomic decisions, as argued by McFarlane (1999).
To control for both of these important factors, we
have included lagged capital intensity (CapInt) per
district, the total size of structures divided by total
of lot sizes per district.
Survival Model Analysis
Survival models are a standard approach for model-
ing the distribution of survival times until a particu-
lar event occurs (Lawless, 1982). The competing
risks method employed here recognizes that once a
given event takes place, it will preclude other events
from taking place, capturing the irreversibility of
land use change decisions. For example, once a
change has occurred from agricultural to industrial
use, that particular piece of land can no longer
change from agricultural to commercial use. This
causes a specific type of censoring which is charac-
teristic of competing risks.
Starting at time 0, we are interested in the length
of time a parcel remains in agriculture. We employ
both a nonparametric model and a parametric
accelerated failure time (AFT) survival model to
investigate the timing of a land conversion. AFT is
applicable for the land use situation where covar-
iates are likely to accelerate or deccelerate survival
time. For the AFT analysis, we assume conversion
decisions relate to land rental values, which are
explained by zoning (type of land use and capital
intensity in a taxing district), local school and infra-
structure taxes, and other spatial factors, such as
existing infrastructure and public goods.
In survival analysis, the time at which an event
occurs is a random variable, denoted by T, and esti-
mating the distribution of T is the goal of the
statistical modeling. The cumulative distribution
function of the random variable is denoted by F(t)
= Pr(T # t), where F(t) is the probability an event T
occurs on or before time t. The survivor function
models survival time, given by S(t) = Pr(T > t) =
1 ! F(t), which is interpreted as being the uncondi-
tional probability of survival beyond time t. In this
analysis, S(t) is interpreted as the probability that
agricultural land can survive forces which would
cause its change to other uses.
Nonparametric analysis of the data can be in-
formative. Of particular interest here is the hazard
function, λ(t), which quantifies the instantaneous
probability of an event taking place at time t, condi-
tioned on the probability of survival through time t.
The hazard function is defined by
  λ(t) ' lim
∆t60





The importance of the hazard function in this analy-
sis is that it recognizes conversion risk only for those
properties which have not yet converted at a given
point in time.
Nonparametric hazard functions generated using
the actuarial, or life table method,
3 are presented
graphically in figure 1. As shown by figure 1, agri-
cultural land was at risk from industrial develop-
ment earlier in the period, and residential develop-
ment risk increased dramatically near the end of the
period (at about 3,250 days). The industrial hazard
curve shows a spike between 1,000 and 2,000 days,
suggesting industrial development peaked early and
was followed by more intensive residential and
commercial development. Wilcoxen and log-rank
test statistics indicate there is a significant (at the
99%+ level) difference in the hazard rates for the
three types of development.
To estimate the parametric model, we adopt a
multivariate Weibull AFT model. The Weibull dis-
tribution is a variant of the exponential distribution
in which Ti = exp(ZN i β)(σgi. When the above model
is linearized by taking logarithms, it is written as
ln(Ti) = ZN i β + ηi, where ηi = ln(σgi) and follows a
Gumbel or extreme value distribution. That is, ηi ~
G(0, σ) with f(ηi) = exp[ηi ! exp(ηi)] and survivor
function S(ηi) = exp[!exp(ηi)]. The corresponding
expressions for ηi as a function of failure time (Ti),
the covariates (Zi), and the parameters (β) are there-
fore written as:
(5)   f ln(Ti), β, Zi '
exp
ln(Ti) & Zi Nβ
σ
& exp
ln(Ti) & Zi Nβ
σ
and




One model is estimated for each category of land con-
version, while accounting for censored observations.
3  In the actuarial method, λ(t) is given by 2q ˆi /[(ti ! ti!1)(1 + p ˆ)i], where
p ˆi is the probability of surviving through the ith time period, and q ˆi is
1 ! p ˆi. Further, censoring during a time interval is assumed to take place

























        Figure 1.  Nonparametric hazard functions
For example, the residential model estimates time to
residential use conversion, while accounting for ob-
servations censored because of land converting to
commercial and industrial use during the observation
period, or because the land remained in agriculture
throughout. Thus, for the residential conversion
category, a log-likelihood function of the following
form is estimated:
(7) lnL(β) ' j
i0D
ln f ln(Ti), β, Zi %
j
i0C
ln S ln(Ti), β, Zi ,
where D denotes the set of properties converting to
residential use during the time period, and C repre-
sents the set of properties remaining in agriculture
or converted to industrial and commercial use dur-
ing the observation period. Analogous likelihood
functions are estimated for the industrial and com-
mercial conversion models.
Parametric AFT Model Results
The residential, commercial, and industrial changes
are estimated using Weibull econometric models,
where each plot is weighted by acre (reported in
table 3). Negative coefficients represent factors cor-
related with earlier conversion times in our sample,
while positive coefficients are variables correlated
with later conversion times.
Of the policy variables (school or infrastructure
tax rates and zoning), only the lagged values of
school (SchoolTax) and infrastructure tax rates
(InfraTax) consistently lengthen development timing
in all three land uses (residential, commercial, and
industrial). Although the theoretical model provides
no guidance for tax effects, the empirical analysis
for our region suggests high-tax districts developed
later than low-tax districts. School taxes have the
effect of slowing commercial and industrial conver-
sion relative to infrastructure taxes. Higher school
tax rates slow residential conversion, even more
so on hillier land, as indicated by the sign of
SchoolTax×Slope. This finding suggests higher tax
rates have less effect on slowing residential devel-
opment on flatter land which is more susceptible to
development into large subdivisions. The fact that
school taxes are fairly ineffective in slowing
residential development may indicate higher school
taxes improve school quality—raising residential
rental values, and thus partly offsetting the tendency
of taxes to slow development.
To assess the influence of zoning, variables
reflecting the outcomes of past zoning decisions are
considered, namely the variables indicating the
percentage of land in different uses for the tax
districts. In the residential equation, the %Ind88
coefficient is larger than that of %Res88 in absolute
terms, suggesting residential development occurred
earlier in regions with higher initial industrial density.152   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Change Models, Weighted by Acres








Intercept 4.957*** 0.189 3.635*** 0.473 8.288*** 0.691
Stream$M 0.081*** 0.005 — — — —
Delaware$M 0.521*** 0.017 0.104** 0.041 0.233*** 0.037
Road$M 0.267*** 0.005 — — — —
Highway$M — — 0.342*** 0.016 0.150*** 0.017
SouthBnd$M — — 0.251*** 0.031 !0.030 0.064
TransLine$M !0.037** 0.005 0.070*** 0.013 0.031* 0.016
Water$M 0.154*** 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.058*** 0.018
School$M !0.075** 0.010 !0.135*** 0.036 — —
Comm$M 0.107*** 0.006 0.527*** 0.017 !0.155*** 0.018
Industry$M !0.251*** 0.010 0.278*** 0.018 0.458*** 0.026
Sewer$M 0.156*** 0.006 0.077*** 0.016 0.137*** 0.023
RingMuni 0.041*** 0.014 0.339*** 0.047 0.235*** 0.047
InfraTax 0.369*** 0.004 0.080*** 0.005 0.044*** 0.005
SchoolTax 0.040*** 0.001 0.107*** 0.004 0.076*** 0.005
SchoolQ !0.018*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.006 0.249 0.012
Slope !0.028*** 0.005 0.072*** 0.028 0.045 0.031
SchoolTax×Slope 0.000*** 0.000 !0.002*** 0.001 !0.000 0.001
AgLeftK !0.003*** 0.000 !0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
CapInt !3.414*** 0.059 !2.524*** 0.267 !2.993*** 0.204
%Ind88 !9.428*** 0.375 !3.403*** 0.785 !6.808*** 1.436
%Com88 22.992*** 0.441 !1.761* 0.980 !3.792** 1.622
%Res88 !6.679*** 0.085 !2.805*** 0.245 0.991* 0.510
%CnvRes !0.802*** 0.112 0.816*** 0.131 !1.098*** 0.190
%CnvCom 0.140 0.121 !0.363*** 0.138 — —
%CnvInd !0.655*** 0.129 1.786*** 0.208 !0.760*** 0.199
Scale 0.689*** 0.005 0.536*** 0.013 0.249*** 0.012
Weibull Shape 1.451*** 0.010 2.120*** 0.131 4.991*** 0.704
 LnL = !55,415,  χ
2 = 42,385 LnL = !3,502,  χ
2 = 11,411    LnL = !633,  χ
2 = 11,088 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; N = 14,988 parcels. Negative coefficients represent
factors correlated with earlier conversion times in the sample, while variables with positive coefficients are correlated with later conversion times.
Over the 1988S1998 time period studied here,
the impact of these two variables changes—i.e.,
the absolute value of the %CnvRes coefficient is
greater than that of %CnvInd. Industrial devel-
opment during the time period is still correlated
with earlier conversion to residential use, but too
much industrial development may ultimately
cause negative externalities. This is supported
by the negative sign on Industry$M, which
indicates there could be negative externalities
associated with living too close to industrial
developments.
Given the theoretical results, it is of interest to
assess the relationship between industrial density
and residential development timing more closely. In
particular, we find that a 1% increase in industrial
development density (%Ind88) would have its
maximum effect on residential development timing
when approximately 10% of the land is in industrial
uses. Thus, for all tax districts with less than 1% of
land in industrial uses, a 1% increase in industrial
development reduces the survival probability of
remaining agricultural land by 0.40%. For tax
districts with 1% to 10% of land in industrial uses,
the survival probability is reduced by 0.51%, and
for tax districts with more than 10% of land in
industrial uses, the survival probability is reduced
by 0.43%.Hite, Sohngen, and Templeton Zoning, Development Timing, and Land Use at the Suburban Fringe   153
Initial commercial development density, %Com88,
is positive and strongly significant in the residential
equation, revealing that residential development
during the period initially occurred away from areas
of heaviest commercial development. The variable
%CnvCom is also positive in the residential equa-
tion, but insignificant, suggesting this relationship
weakens. Commercial development, at least in our
study region, appears to follow industrial and resi-
dential development. In the commercial equation,
the signs on all three initial land use variables are
negative, with %Ind88 being the largest in absolute
terms, followed by %Res88 and %Com88. Thus, the
earliest commercial developments occurred where
industrial or residential development were already
greatest. Commercial development occurred later in
regions where residential and industrial develop-
ment during the period of analysis were strongest,
as indicated by the positive signs of %CnvRes and
%CnvInd in the commercial equation. From the
analysis of marginal survival probabilities, a 1%
increase in residential development within a tax
district does not begin to speed commercial devel-
opment until residential uses rise above 32% of local
land uses.
At least initially, it appears industrial devel-
opment occurred away from the most heavily
developed residential regions in the county. The
negative sign on %CnvRes in the industrial equa-
tion, however, suggests conversion to industrial use
during the study period occurred earlier in regions
experiencing relatively larger losses of land to
residential uses. This finding is surprising, although
it potentially reflects the long time lags associated
with industrial development projects. It also indi-
cates that regions experiencing relatively larger
losses of land to residential uses were likewise
prone to relatively larger losses of land to industrial
uses.
Turning to the control variables (table 3), the
slope of a lot (Slope) speeds residential development,
slows commercial development, and has no impact
on the rate of industrial development. Commercial
development occurred earlier on better agricultural
land, while residential development occurred earlier
on sloped land less suitable for agricultural uses.
Land further from electrical transmission lines
developed into residential uses earlier, while land
closer to transmission lines developed into com-
mercial or industrial uses sooner. Distance from
water bodies had the opposite effect on develop-
ment timing for all three uses (although insignif-
icant for commercial), suggesting residential land
nearer to lakes and streams is more desirable for
residential development.
Total agricultural land in a district during the
previous year (AgLeftK) has a small, negative effect
on the timing of residential and commercial
development, but does not have an impact upon
speed of conversion to industrial use. This result is
consistent with development patterns for land with-
in one mile of municipal boundaries (RingMuni).
Land close to municipalities is found to develop
more slowly than other land in the sample, indi-
cating land is held speculatively in agricultural use
at the urban-rural fringe. Interestingly, this effect is
largest for commercial and industrial developments,
i.e., they are shifting away from incorporated areas,
as found by Fujita, Thisse, and Zenou (1997).
Finally, lagged capital intensity (CapInt) within
a tax district is shown to significantly increase the
rate of conversion to all three types of land use,
with the largest impact on rate of conversion to
residential use. Note that this variable is highly
correlated with the value of developed land, and
thus should have a negative sign as predicted by our
theoretical model.
Policy Analysis
An unweighted residential model of an otherwise
identical specification to the acre-weighted model
is estimated and used to examine the effects of
policy changes on residential conversion time.
4 The
unweighted model parameters are similar in sign to
those in the weighted model, although the estimates
are more highly significant in the weighted model.
For the sake of brevity, the unweighted model is not
presented here.
Using the unweighted model, seven potential
policy actions are examined including tax changes
and zoning changes. These policy actions are: (a) a
20% increase in school taxes for each taxing district
({SchoolTax+SchoolTax×Slope}(1.20); (b) a 20%
increase in infrastructure taxes (InfraTax(1.20);
(c) a 20% increase in all taxes; (d) a law that reduces
capital intensity by 20% (CapInt(0.80), a proxy for
lot size zoning restrictions; (e) a 20 % decrease in
annual residential growth (%CnvRes(0.80); (f ) a
20% decrease in annual industrial growth; and
4  The reason for using the unweighted model is that interpretation of
weighted model predictions is difficult. Further, the type of analysis per-
formed here cannot be used accurately with the industrial and commercial
models because the heavy censoring causes inaccurate prediction times
(Allison, 1995). Results for the unweighted model are available from the
authors upon request.154   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4. Policy Simulations: Predicted Days to Conversion
A.  ALL LAND (N = 14,988 parcels)
Policy Action Scenario   Median Days Mean Days Std. Error Mean
Baseline 3,847.99 6,836.10 411.22
(a) 8  School Tax 0.2 4,274.08 7,300.25 411.96
(b) 8  Infrastructure Tax 0.2 5,216.97 18,370.49 1,969.58
(c) 8  All Tax 0.2 5,838.23 19,040.81 1,973.52
(d) 9  Capital Intensity 0.2 4,172.22 7,280.48 436.23
(e) 9  Residential Development 0.2 3,995.41 7,041.44 413.67
(f) 9  Industrial Development 0.2 3,874.01 6,892.44 419.70
(g) 9  Residential+Industrial Development 0.2 4,025.90 7,097.94 422.12
B.  UNCONVERTED AG LAND IN 1998 (N = 5,678 parcels) – Adjusted t0 = January 1998
Policy Action Scenario   Median Days Mean Days Std. Error Mean
Baseline 422.00 6,061.64 982.97
(a) 8  School Tax 0.2 947.16 6,666.56 984.56
(b) 8  Infrastructure Tax 0.2 2,478.77 28,423.19 4,712.79
(c) 8  All Tax 0.2 3,205.82 29,321.09 4,722.03
(d) 9  Capital Intensity 0.2 477.68 6,261.49 1,014.32
(e) 9  Residential Development 0.2 667.32 6,314.23 983.77
(f) 9  Industrial Development 0.2 430.28 6,188.32 1,005.79
(g) 9  Residential+Industrial Development 0.2 669.68 6,441.10 1,006.62
Note: Arrows (8, 9) denote tax increases and decreases, respectively.
(g) a 20% decrease in growth of combined residen-
tial and industrial development types.
While we cannot specifically test how zoning
decisions affect development, these scenarios can
provide an indication about how changes in zoning
policies would affect subsequent development.
Note, the results show that a policy on commercial
development would have little or no effect, because
commercial development in our study occurs after
residential or industrial development.
Table 4 (panel A) reports the results of policy
analyses for all residential plots in the sample, as
well as for just those parcels remaining in agricul-
tural use in 1998 (panel B). Predicted survival times
for parcels remaining in agricultural use were
adjusted to reflect the predicted number of days
until conversion after January 1, 1998.
It is difficult to assess the relative effects of all
the policies because we have not attempted to mea-
sure whether the policies imply similar economic
costs on society. The 20% changes in taxes do
imply similar changes in tax payments per dollar
of investment, however, so the tax policies in
scenarios (a)S(c) can be compared.
As expected, infrastructure tax increases (scenario
b) have a larger effect on residential development
times than school tax increases (scenario a). If
school taxes were raised by 20% for all districts,
the median days to conversion would increase by
about 11% or 14 months (4,274.08 versus the
3,847.99 baseline median days) for the full sample,
and by about 10% or 17 months for the parcels that
had not yet converted in 1998. An increase in infra-
structure taxes lengthens residential conversion
time more, 3.8 years for the full sample and 5.7
years for the unconverted parcels. A combined
increase in school and infrastructure taxes does not
result in a proportional increase in days to con-
version.
The analysis does not allow for realistic within-
sample predictions for capital intensity, because
minimum lot size restrictions would be applied
differentially throughout the sample (i.e., lot size
restrictions would not be applied in percentage terms
as in our analysis). Nevertheless, by comparing
predicted days to conversion for the policy actions
to those predicted by the baseline, such simulations
can illustrate relative impacts among the restrictive
zoning policies (i.e., capital intensity and growth
restrictions). For the full sample, a 20% capital
intensity reduction would be the zoning change
most effective in slowing growth (4,172.22 medianHite, Sohngen, and Templeton Zoning, Development Timing, and Land Use at the Suburban Fringe   155
days to conversion) as compared to residential and
industrial restrictions (3,995.41 and 3,874.01, respec-
tively) and 3,847.99 baseline median days. Of the
1998 unconverted agriculture land, however, a
restriction on all types of development would slow
median time to development to about 1.8 years, as
opposed to capital intensity restrictions (1.22 years).
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper explores how taxes and zoning affect the
timing of land use change decisions at the urban-
rural fringe. A theoretical model suggests changes
in property tax rates and zoning policies can have
positive or negative effects on the timing of land
conversion from agricultural to residential, commer-
cial, or industrial uses. While higher property tax
rates reduce land values and should slow land use
change, they could speed land use change if they
increase public services and make some locations
more attractive for development, such as with taxes
specifically designated for schools.
Zoning in the theoretical model focuses on the
decisions communities make to allow industrial or
commercial development to occur in specific
regions, and what effect this has on the timing of
subsequent residential, industrial, or commercial
development. The model shows that industrial
development density can have positive or negative
effects on development timing, depending on how
this density influences local public service flows.
For example, industrial development can have neg-
ative externalities and slow development on nearby
properties, but it also may speed residential conver-
sion by raising tax revenues for local jurisdictions
and increasing the overall level of public services
provided.
A competing risks survival model is developed
and estimated to investigate how a number of dif-
ferent variables influenced development timing of
residential, commercial, and industrial land in a
rapidly growing county of the Midwest (Delaware
County, Ohio) from 1988 to 1998. Both nonpara-
metric and parametric results are reported.
Our empirical framework, while informative, has
two important limitations. First, the coefficients in
the parametric model cannot be specifically identi-
fied. The estimated models, however, do show how
tax or zoning policies potentially affect develop-
ment timing within Delaware County. Second, we
do not monitor individual zoning decisions for each
parcel, but assuming zoning decisions are relatively
uniform across different taxing regions, we assess
the impact of zoning policies on commercial,
industrial, or residential land uses by assuming the
development that does occur reflects local public
policy on important zoning decisions.
While the theoretical results on the effects of
taxes on development timing are unclear, the empir-
ical results reveal higher property tax rates slow
development timing. The most important effect of
a change in the property tax rate, such as through a
referendum, appears to occur through the capital-
ization of tax rates into land values, rather than
through the direct change in annual property taxes
paid. Still, not all taxes are created equal, as changes
in infrastructure taxes have a stronger effect on
residential conversion than changes in school taxes.
The opposite results hold for industrial and com-
mercial developments. Localities that raise infra-
structure taxes are likely to observe less rapid
residential development in the future, although they
could experience more rapid conversion to commer-
cial or industrial development.
As for zoning, policies at the urban-rural fringe
designed to restrict residential development, such as
minimum lot size restrictions, could enhance the
likelihood of industrial sitings in the future. Indus-
trial development in our data initially occurred in
regions with high proportions of existing industrial
and commercial development and low residential
development density. There are several explana-
tions for this result. First, regions with a high pro-
portion of residential landowners likely developed
zoning restrictions which precluded industrial
developments. Second, these regions also tend to
have tax policies favoring school taxes, and thus
deterring industrial development. Third, following
Fujita, Thisse, and Zenou (1997), it is possible that
land values become too high in residential areas for
industrial development. Finally, residents in rural
areas may have less bargaining power in keeping
industrial sites from locating nearby.
5
Alternatively, zoning policies designed to restrict
industrial development can have both positive and
negative influences on the timing of residential
development. While proximity to industrial locations
appears to slow residential development timing,
within the time frame of this study, residential devel-
opment timing occurred more quickly in regions
with high initial industrial development as well as
in regions with large losses to industrial develop-
ment over time. Based on our findings, the marginal
effect of a small increase in industrial development
5  We thank Stephen Swallow for bringing this point to our attention.156   April 2003 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
density has its largest effect at approximately 10%
industrial density. Thus, regions with less than 10%
industrial density that zone for additional industrial
development may not only face decreased levels of
environmental amenities, but also increasing devel-
opment pressure.
Unlike industrial development, commercial devel-
opment follows residential development, a finding
that emerges in both the nonparametric and the para-
metric results. Commercial development becomes
most prevalent after the percentage of residential
land in a district surpasses about 32%. This makes
sense if commercial developments—such as shop-
ping malls, grocery stores, and gas stations—
require fairly intense nearby residential development
to be profitable.
From our simulations, tax policies are shown to
have a stronger influence on development timing
than zoning policies. Furthermore, infrastructure
taxes have a larger effect on residential timing than
school taxes, possibly because school quality is
important in many residential location decisions,
and higher school taxes could imply better school
quality. For the zoning policies, lot size restrictions
appear to be more effective at slowing residential
development than policies aimed at limiting spe-
cific types of development, although this result
depends critically on initial capital intensity. For
example, when just the remaining agricultural
land is considered, lot size restrictions are much
less effective because most unconverted parcels
are in regions already characterized by low capital
intensity.
Clearly, one of the main limitations of this analy-
sis is that our measures of zoning are relatively
primitive. Specifically, we do not measure actual
zoning decisions, but instead consider how taxing
regions set policies across parcels. The results are
nonetheless instructive in showing the interactions
among industrial, residential, and commercial devel-
opment. These results may be useful for policy
decisions faced by cities at the urban-rural fringe as
they grow. For example, not only does industrial
development appear to precede residential develop-
ment, it appears to occur simultaneously with resi-
dential development, at least up to a certain density
of industrial development (in our model, 10%).
Undeveloped regions that promote industrial
development are likely to see future residential de-
velopment. On the other hand, commercial develop-
ment follows residential and industrial development,
and it appears to peak at about 32% residential
density. As residential development occurs, planners
need to recognize that commercial development will
follow, and they should begin formulating plans for
such development far in advance.
Of course, we acknowledge these are fairly coarse
results, and that many important zoning decisions
(e.g., lot size restrictions, septic systems) are likely
to occur at a finer level than explored in this study.
Further data collection on changes in zoning laws,
variances, and so on, over the time period could
provide more detailed information on the spatial
effect of zoning.
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